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Abstract: The difficult conciliation between the protection of the right to 
respect for private life, specially the confidentiality of personal data, and the 
rights to protection of copyright and to an effective remedy is the key issue 
decided  by  the  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  in  Case  C-275/06, 
Promusicae. In order to safeguard other persons’ rights, the Court approves 
of  limits  to  the  privacy  and  these  limits  are  sanctioned  to  damage  the 
confidentiality of personal data, generated by the traffic in the electronic 
communications. In our opinion, in spite of the Court’s praiseworthy efforts 
to balancing the rights concerned, the judgement creates an instrument that 
entails a danger for freedom. 
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Living in the information society brings 
into the daily life of every citizen features 
and  services  that  incorporate  a  new 
perspective  in  the  protection  of 
fundamental rights.  
The new technology, the massive access 
of population to the worldwide system of 
communications,  the  use  of  formats  and 
supports different from the traditional ones 
and subject to constant changes, are some 
of  the  elements  that  make  up  that  new 
perspective, the one of the virtual world, 
for  whose  treatment  the  habitual  legal 
mechanisms, those that are used in the real 
world are not effective.  
Community law is not alien to this recent 
problematic  that  concerns  the  settings 
needed  for  the  accomplishment,  without 
obstacles and on equal conditions, of the 
inner market in electronic communications 
sector. In this new scenario, there are two 
fundamental  rights  especially  involved, 
often opposite, the right to private life or to 
privacy,  and  the  right  to  intellectual 
property.  
Therefore,  when  dealing  with  those 
settings,  Community  rules,  and  thus 
national rules, must pay attention to some 
aspects  related  to  the  protection  of  the 
fundamental rights that can be affected in a 
significant  way  by  using  the  electronic 
communication networks and services.  
The right to privacy, whose basic status 
was  already  defined  by  Warren  and 
Brandeis  in  1899,  protects  «the  sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life» [1], 
and, in their perspective, provides to every 
person «the right to be let alone».  García Soto M.: The Right to Privacy and the Right to Intellectual Property in Internet…  189 
Nevertheless,  the  potential  attempts  to 
private  life,  and  specifically  to  personal 
data,  issued  from  the  technological 
progress, have added an active perspective 
to  enable  an  individual  to  control  all 
management  and  processing  data  which 
could  concern  him  or  her.  As  a  result, 
many  States  guarantee  the  right  to  be 
informed  when  personal  data  was 
processed, the right to know the reason for 
this processing, the right to access the data 
and if required, the right to have the data 
amended  or  deleted.  [2]  But  these 
legislations are not always coincident and, 
in  the  European  Union,  the  differences 
could  raise  some  troubles  to  the  flow  of 
information  among  States.  On  the  other 
hand,  copyright  holders  can  see  their 
legitimate  expectations  frustrated  because 
of a fraudulent use of telecommunications 
system. 
One of the conflictive situations brought 
about by the information society gives rise 
to the sentence of the European Court of 
Justice  (hereafter,  ECJ),  C-275/06,  of 
January, 29, 2008, the Promusicae case.[3] 
That is the problem derived from the hard 
conciliation  between  the  respect  to 
personal privacy with the protection due to 
intellectual  property  and  particularly,  to 
copyright. The infringements of copyright 
using  the  network  of  internet  are  at  the 
origin  of  the  lawsuit  before  the  national 
judge,  although  the  consequences  of  the 
ECJ  conclusions  could  be  applicable, 
beyond this illegal use of the network, to 
other  situations  developed  through  the 
telecommunications  system.  The  Court 
approves  of  limits  to  the  privacy  to 
safeguard other persons’ rights, and these 
limits  are  sanctioned  to  damage  the 
confidentiality of personal data, generated 
by  the  traffic  in  the  electronic 
communications.  In  spite  of  the  Court’s 
praiseworthy efforts to balancing the rights 
concerned,  the  judgement  creates  an 
instrument  that  entails  a  danger  for 
freedom.  The  task  was  not  easy  for  the 
ECJ  and  so  the  judgement  is  long, 
complex, with a cautious approach to the 
problem, finally leaving the decision to the 
Member States. 
Productores  de  Música  de  España, 
(hereafter, Promusicae), is a Spanish non-
profit-  making  organisation,  acting  on 
behalf  of  its  members,  copyright  holders 
and  holders  of  related  rights  (producers 
and publishers of musical and audio-visual 
recordings). It applied, in November 2005, 
to the Juzgado núm. 5 de lo Mercantil de 
Madrid  against  Telefónica,  an  internet 
services  provider,  for  preliminary 
measures  to  oblige  the  latter  to  disclose 
personal data of peer to peer users, in order 
to  start  civil  procedures.  Promusicae 
alleged that these persons, whose direction 
«IP»,  dates  and  hours  of  internet 
connection  were  known,  made  use  of 
KaZaA file exchange software to store and 
exchange  music  files  which  Promusicae 
members  were  copyright  holders.  The 
Spanish  judge,  at  first,  acceded  and 
ordered Telefónica to disclose the personal 
data required, but Telefónica opposed and 
argued  that  Spanish  law  authorized  the 
communication  of  these  data  only  in  a 
criminal investigation or for the purpose of 
safeguarding  public  security  and  national 
defence,  not  in  civil  proceedings  or  as  a 
preliminary  measure  relating  to  civil 
proceedings.  Promusicae  replied  by 
arguing  the interpretation of  Spanish  law 
accordingly  to  Directives  2000/31, 
2001/29  and  2004/48  and  with  Articles 
17.2 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the  European Union (hereafter, 
the Charter), provisions which would not 
allow Member States to limit solely to the 
purposes expressly mentioned in that law 
the obligation to communicate the data in 
question.  [4]  The  Judge  stayed  the 
proceedings  and  consulted  the  ECJ  for  a 
preliminary  ruling,  submitting  the 
following  question:  «Does  Community 
law, specifically Articles 15(2) and 18 of 
Directive [2000/31], Article 8(1) and (2) of 
Directive [2001/29], Article 8 of Directive 
[2004/48] and Articles 17(2) and 47 of the 
Charter … permit Member States to limit 
to the context of a criminal investigation or 
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defence, thus excluding civil proceedings, 
the  duty  of  operators  of  electronic 
communications  networks  and  services, 
providers of access to telecommunications 
networks  and  providers  of  data  storage 
services  to  retain  and  make  available 
connection  and  traffic  data  generated  by 
the communications established during the 
supply of an information society service?» 
In  her  opinion,  the  Advocate  General, 
Julianne  Kokott,  considering  the  rights 
implied in the case, found it was necessary 
to  extend  the  parameters  of  Community 
law  that  would  serve  like  interpretative 
canon of the national norm that provokes 
the preliminary ruling. Consequently, five 
Directives  would  form  the  judgment 
Community law framework. Three of these 
are  the  Directives  mentioned  by  the 
national  judge,  2000/31,  2001/29  and 
2004/48  [5]  (hereafter,  the  three  together 
as  Directives  on  E-commerce  and 
intellectual  property).  The  other  two 
norms, that the ECJ will also count on, are 
the  Directive  95/46,  on  the  protection  of 
individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of 
such  data;  and  Directive  2002/58  [6],  a 
specific  regulation  concerning  the 
processing  of  personal  data  and  the 
protection  of  privacy  in  the  electronic 
communications  sector  (hereafter,  these 
both  together,  as  Data  protection 
Directives). 
However,  despite  this  common  initial 
criterion of analysis, the Advocate General 
proposed a thesis that is not assumed by 
the ECJ. A well contrived discourse leads 
the  Advocate  General  to  declare 
compatible  with  Community  law  the 
national  regulation  that  denies  the 
possibility to disclose personal traffic data 
to  private  persons  to  be  used  in  civil 
procedures. The Data protection Directives 
(95/46  and  2002/58)  would  act  as  a 
framework  and  would  take  precedence 
over  the  E-commerce  and  intellectual 
property Directives (2000/31, 2001/29 and 
2004/48),  although  that  does  not  mean 
primacy of Data protection Directives but 
necessity  to  find  a  suitable  balance. 
Besides, she stresses the link between data 
protection  and  fundamental  rights, 
particularly  the  right  to  private  life, 
included in the Article 8 of the European 
Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed 
in Rome on 4 November 1950 (hereafter, 
the ECHR), confirmed by the Charter that 
includes specifically the data protection in 
Article  8.  From  these  norms  derives  the 
exigency  of  legal  foreseeability  that,  for 
data protection, expresses «in the criterion 
–  expressly  mentioned  in  Article 8  (2)  of 
the  Charter  –  of  purpose  limitation». 
Personal data  may only be collected and 
processed  (Article 6(1)(b)  of  Directive 
95/46),  for  specified,  explicit  and 
legitimate  purposes  and  «not  further 
processed  in  a  way  incompatible  with 
those  purposes».  Only  a  pressing  social 
need  can  justify  an  interference  measure 
into  private  life  that  must  always  be 
proportioned to the purpose. Certainly, the 
fundamental  rights  to  property  and  to  an 
effective judicial protection of holders of 
copyrights  may  be  considered  as  a 
legitimate  purpose,  deserving  of 
protection.  Nevertheless,  the  Advocate 
General  does  not  find,  among  the 
exceptions to the protection of private life 
stated  in  Data  protection  Directives,  the 
possibility  to  compel  internet  service 
providers to disclose personal traffic data 
and to provide them to private persons in 
order  to  pursuit  in  civil  proceedings  the 
infringements  of  copyright.  Nor  in  the 
Directive  95/46,  neither  in  the  Directive 
2002/58  is  there  a  legitimate  cause  to 
interfere  in  private  life  in  the  way 
Promusicae  applied.  She,  particularly, 
analyses  the  relation  between  Article  13 
Directive  95/46  and  Article  15  Directive 
2002/58 (both articles containing the list of 
exceptions  referred  to  the  protection  of 
personal data) to conclude that this one, as 
the  specific  data  protection  law  in 
telecommunications sector has chosen the 
exceptions applicable in this field and has 
not  included  the  protection  of  rights  and 
freedoms  of  others  as  one  of  these 
exceptions.  This  is  the  major  point  of García Soto M.: The Right to Privacy and the Right to Intellectual Property in Internet…  191 
disagreement with the ECJ statement, even 
if there  is  a  basic  coincidence to  declare 
that  «the  authorities  and  courts  of  the 
Member  States  are  not  only  required  to 
interpret their national law in conformity 
with  the  Data  Protection  Directives,  but 
also to ensure that they do not act on the 
basis  of  an  interpretation  of  those 
directives  which  conflicts  with  the 
fundamental  rights  protected  by  the 
Community  legal  order  or  the  other 
general principles of Community law».[7] 
In its judgement, the ECJ found that the 
communication of the names and addresses 
of  users  of  KaZaA  involves  the 
transmission  of  personal  data  [8]  and 
constitutes the processing of personal data 
within the meaning of the first paragraph 
of Article 2 of Directive 2002/58, read in 
conjunction with Article 2(b) of Directive 
95/46. So, first of all, the ECJ determines 
if the legal framework formed by the Data 
protection Directives and the Directives on 
E-commerce  and  intellectual  property 
compels Member States to enforce the duty 
to  disclose  personal  data  in  civil 
proceedings  to  warranty  the  effective 
protection  of  intellectual  property.  Its 
analysis  of  secondary  legislation  on  data 
protection  concludes  that  the  Member 
States are not precluded from laying down 
an obligation to disclose personal data in 
the  context  of  civil  proceedings,  though 
they are not compelled to lay down such an 
obligation.[9]  In  second  place,  the  ECJ 
infers  from  the  E-commerce  and 
intellectual  property  Directives  that  they 
do  not  contain  an  obligation  for  the 
member States to lay down an obligation 
to disclose personal data to be used in civil 
proceedings to protect the rights of holders 
of copyright.[10] Thirdly, it considers the 
exigencies  issued  from  the  articles  17.2 
and  47  of  the  Charter  that  the  national 
Judge alleged. Since the fundamental right 
to  property,  that  includes  the  right  to 
copyright,  and  the  fundamental  right  to 
effective  judicial  protection  have  been 
declared general principles of Community 
law,  the  ECJ  examines  if  they  would  be 
violated  by  an  interpretation  of  the 
Directives on E-commerce and intellectual 
property,  that  would  not  oblige  the 
Member States to lay down the obligation 
to communicate personal data to ensure the 
protection of the right to copyright in civil 
proceedings. Doing so, the ECJ comes to 
the  essential  question  in  the  national 
process,  this  is,  the  conflict  between  the 
fundamental  rights  and  the  necessary 
conciliation  of  the  different  interests 
protected.  As  the  ECJ  remembers,  it  is 
necessary to take care of, not only the right 
to  property  and  the  right  to  effective 
judicial  protection,  but  also  the  right  to 
data protection, as part of the fundamental 
right to privacy. The Directive 2002/58 is 
the specific norm that protects the privacy 
in the telecommunications sector, directly 
related to the articles 7 and 8 of the Charter 
which recognises the right to privacy and 
the right to data protection, being Article 8 
of the Charter a transcript of article 8 of 
the ECHR. But the way to make possible 
the conciliation of both protected spheres 
is  the  Gordian  knot  that  must  be  cut  to 
solve  the  problem  raised  by  the  national 
judge.  According  to  the  ECJ,  the 
mechanisms  to  find  the  fair  balance  are 
contained, first, in the Directive 2002/58, 
the specific protective norm of private life 
in the field of electronic communications, 
and  also  in  the  E-commerce  and 
intellectual property Directives. Secondly, 
these  mechanisms  are  contained  in  the 
measures  for  implementation  and 
application adopted by the Member States 
that  must  respect  the  rights  protected  by 
the Community law and the other general 
principles of Community law, such as the 
principle of proportionality.  
The Promusicae judgement confirms the 
relevance  to  Community  law  of  the 
fundamental  rights,  whose  balancing 
becomes  a  singular  principle  of 
interpreting  European  and  national  law. 
These  balancing  requirements,  together 
with the other principles of European Law, 
such as the principle of proportionality, are 
clearly  and  strongly  stated  in  the 
Promusicae case.[11] Member States must 
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when adopting national rules to implement 
Community  law,  as  well  as  measures  to 
carry  out  their  related  obligations,  but 
further  more  there  are  no  concrete 
recommendations  from  the  ECJ  to 
accomplish  this  difficult  task.  The 
Promusicae  judgement  goes  on  with  the 
ECJ  traditional  case-law  about  the 
fundamental rights at the European Union 
and reaffirms their enhanced force, lack of 
a  binding  real  catalogue.  Nevertheless, 
admitting  the  possibility  of  attempts  to 
personal data and thus, to private life, the 
ECJ  brings  into  existence  an  instrument 
whose  danger  we  can  not  ignore.  The 
legitimate cause for these attempts would 
be  the  rights  of  others  but  the  limits  for 
these  interventions  or  the  kind  of  rights 
that would give way to these interferences 
are  not  defined  by  the  ECJ.  We  could 
consider that only other fundamental rights 
can justify the attempt to personal data but 
the ECJ dose not specify or concretise.[12] 
As  a  result,  an  uncertainty  remains  that 
could be avoided by the reference made to 
the principle of proportionality which links 
to  the  rich  ECJ  case-law  in  the  field  of 
fundamental  rights.[13]  However,  it 
doesn’t lighten the immanent difficulty for 
every  measure  channelled  to  give 
satisfaction to a conflict of rights. The ECJ 
does not give precisions to illustrate how 
Member States must reach, in the practice, 
a  fair  balance  between  the  right  to 
copyright  and  the  right  to  privacy, 
specifically  the  right  to  protection  of 
personal  data.  If  it  meant  that  Member 
States  should  have  included  additional 
exceptions  to  the  Directive  2002/58  to 
allow  the  eventual  communication  of 
personal data in civil proceedings, there is 
no indication about it or about the situation 
of  States,  like  Spain,  that  have  made  a 
literal  transposition  of  this  Directive.[14] 
Finally,  it  must  be  considered  that  the 
exigency of foreseeability of any limits to 
the  fundamental  rights  is  fixed  for  data 
protection  in  the  criterion  of  purpose 
limitation. The data can only be collected 
for  the  specified  and  legitimate 
purposes,[15]  and  loyally  processed  in  a 
way compatible with those purposes. This 
exigency  prevents  from  processing 
personal data to attain any other objective. 
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